Board Capture in the Nonprofit Sector? An Exploration of a Possible Cause and Solution
研究非营利组织董事会是否像营利组织那样对CEO的财务表现做出反应，发现非营利董事会在多数情况下监督较宽松，仅在财务结果威胁长期偿付能力时才行动，可能考虑通过补偿董事会成员来改善监督。
Responsibilities of nonprofit boards of directors include financial oversight and supervision of the CEO. Lack of expertise and the nature of supervision may contribute to board capture, characterized by longer executive tenure despite poor financial performance. We explore whether nonprofit boards are as responsive as for-profit boards to poor CEO financial performance. Our analyses indicate that the boards of the largest nonprofits do not definitively respond to changes in revenues, expenses, savings, or profit in CEO tenure decisions. This contrasts sharply with our for-profit results. However, changes in net assets as a fraction of total assets provoke nonprofit board responses comparable to those of for-profit boards. These findings are consistent with a pattern wherein nonprofit boards provide relatively lax financial oversight most of the time, but act when financial results threaten long-term solvency. Nonprofit boards might consider compensating board members to improve supervision of CEOs.