Competitive Effects of Entry in Gasoline Markets
利用墨西哥加油站面板数据，研究发现新加油站进入使3分钟车程内的常规汽油价格下降零售价差的6%，竞争效应随距离递减，且对单一加油站市场影响最大。
ABSTRACT We use panel data on the location, prices, and quality of the universe of gas stations in Mexico to study the competitive effects of entry on incumbent firms. Using more than 1000 entry events and defining local markets based on the road network, we find that the entry of a new station within 3 min driving time decreases regular gasoline prices by 6% of the retail price spread. Competitive effects decline with travel time and are largest in markets that previously had only one station. Entry of stations with the same owner as the incumbent has near‐zero effects. The effect of competition on quality is less clear, with suggestive evidence of improved service quality in some specifications.