The manipulability of the deferred acceptance mechanism without outside options
研究了Gale-Shapley婚姻模型中，当代理人不能拒绝潜在伴侣时，男性提议的延迟接受机制在何种条件下是所有稳定机制中可操纵性最小的。
In the Gale–Shapley marriage model where agents cannot declare potential partners as unacceptable, the number of manipulating agents of the man-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is minimum among all stable mechanisms if and only if men are fewer than women. When the numbers of agents on both sides of the market are equal, we demonstrate that the deferred acceptance mechanism might not possess the aforementioned least manipulability property. However, if the preference profile is symmetrically tiered, as previously studied by Kesten (2010), and there are no more than three agents in the last tier, the deferred acceptance mechanism still possesses that property.