Boards of Banks
研究了90个国家2000-2020年银行董事会数据，发现国家特征主要解释董事会独立性差异，但对银行业务经验解释力弱；美国银行在董事银行业经验上落后于全球同行。
Bank board directors are highly independent but possess limited prior banking experience. Using a sample of banks from 90 countries between 2000 and 2020, we find that country-specific characteristics explain most of the cross-sectional variation in bank board independence. In contrast, country characteristics have little explanatory power for boards’ banking experience. While we document evidence of international convergence in bank board independence, U.S. banks lag behind their global counterparts in director banking experience. The data suggest that country-specific laws and regulations primarily shape bank board composition through requirements for director independence.