Ex Post Settling Up of Financial Misreporting and CEO Compensation
研究发现，对于任期较短的CEO，公司采用追回条款能更有效地减少财务错报，同时董事会会调整这些CEO的薪酬合同以降低追回条款带来的额外薪酬风险。
ABSTRACT In the early years of their terms of service, CEOs tend to face greater concerns about their careers and uncertainties regarding their abilities, leading them to inflate earnings in an attempt to influence their perceived abilities. We find that financial misreporting decreases to a greater extent after firms with shorter tenured CEOs adopt clawback provisions, which allows boards to recoup excess compensation based on misstated earnings. Moreover, following the adoption of clawback provisions by firms with shorter tenured CEOs, the sensitivity of CEO annual pay to poor accounting performance diminishes, along with a reduced sensitivity of CEO equity portfolio to stock returns and an increased sensitivity to stock return volatility. Our evidence suggests that clawback provisions are particularly effective in curbing financial misreporting among CEOs who face greater career concerns and ability uncertainties. In response, boards adjust the compensation contracts of these CEOs to mitigate the incremental compensation risk imposed by the adoption of clawback provisions.