When the Servant Is Also Master: A Theory on the Dual Role of Public Managers
该文提出公共管理者在政治行政层级中同时扮演委托人和代理人的双重角色，并基于忠诚与可信度两个维度，区分出四种理想类型策略（侍从、首领、独行侠、外交家），帮助理解管理者如何在不同情境下应对这一角色冲突。
ABSTRACT Public managers at all levels of the political‐administrative hierarchy take on a dual role as both principal and agent simultaneously. Because of this dual role, it is relevant for public managers to maintain credibility with their agents and remain loyal to their principals. This article develops a theory arguing that public managers can approach their dual role in a given situation utilizing a strategy based on one of four ideal types: Squires prioritize loyalty, Chieftains prioritize credibility, Mavericks prioritize neither, while Diplomats prioritize both. The relative distribution of preferences and information among public managers, and their principals and agents determines the viability of utilizing each strategy in that situation. The article contributes with a theoretical framework that allows us to better understand and analyze the dual role of public managers. It also promotes a research agenda by outlining relevant situations to examine and potential implications of the theory.