The effect of the anti‐corruption campaign in China: Evidence from housing transactions
利用政府官员购买新房时获得的折扣作为腐败度量，发现2012年反腐运动后折扣大幅下降，但对二手房无影响，官员也更少购买带幸运数字的住房，表明反腐有效。
Abstract Using price discounts government officials receive when buying new housing units as a measure of corruption in China, we examine the effect of the anti‐corruption campaign launched by the Xi Jinping administration in 2012. We find that the discounts decrease sharply after the campaign. On the other hand, we find no effect of the campaign on existing housing sales. Furthermore, officials become less likely to purchase housing units with lucky numbers. Overall, the results suggest that the anti‐corruption campaign is effective in curbing corruption.