Political Connections and Corporate Debt Structure: The Moderating Effect of India's Government‐owned Banks
研究了2003-2022年印度企业政治关联对债务结构的影响，发现向主要政党捐款的企业通过国有银行获得更多长期债务，揭示了国有银行与企业间的合谋问题。
In the corporate finance literature, much attention has been paid to the relationship between politicians and businesses. Our paper explores novel data to show the role of political connections on corporate debt structure in India during the period 2003–2022. We find that firms donating to the major political parties (Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) and the Indian National Congress (INC)) have higher long‐term debt (LTD), which is mainly obtained through government‐owned banks (GOBs). These banks exhibit a positive and moderate effect on the LTD of only those firms that contribute to both the BJP and the INC, which highlights an issue of collusion between GOBs and firms, and calls into question their ethics regarding public money. Finally, politically connected firms enjoy easy access to credit through rent‐seeking and the GOB channel. These findings remain robust to several dynamic panel data specifications, sectoral control, and robustness checks.