The effect of repeated games on demand information transparency and manufacturer's sales decisions
研究平台与制造商在供应链中的战略互动，制造商先为平台生产自有品牌产品，再考虑推出后续产品。分析动态合同如何减少信息不对称、提升供应链协调和利润，并发现制造商对后续产品的销售渠道选择取决于平台佣金率，动态合同能将静态合同下的输赢结果转为双赢。
This study explores the strategic interaction between a platform and a manufacturer within a supply chain, where the manufacturer initially produces a product for the platform's private label and subsequently considers launching a follower product. We focus on the manufacturer's decision regarding the sales channel of the the follow-on product and develop a dynamic contractual mechanism aimed at improving demand information accuracy. Analytical results demonstrate that dynamic contracts effectively reduce information asymmetry, enhance supply chain coordination, and improve the overall profitability of the supply chain. We also find that the manufacturer's choice of sales channel for the follow-on product depends on the platform's commission rate, and that win-win channel selection outcomes can be achieved under both static and dynamic contracts. Furthermore, our analysis shows that dynamic contracts can transform the win-lose outcomes arising from channel choices under static contracts into win-win scenarios, thereby achieving a Pareto improvement.