Why Bonuses Promote Deviant Behaviors: A Self‐Determination Theory Perspective
研究基于自我决定理论，分析游戏公司奖金特征对开发者工作动机和越轨行为的影响，发现奖金大小对动机影响有限，而奖金概率的确定性与大小概率通过降低动机缺失和外部调节间接减少道德推脱和偷工减料行为。
ABSTRACT Bonuses are notoriously used to motivate workers. How effective are they at doing so, and might there be unintended consequences? We investigated the effectiveness of bonuses based on game profitability on the motivation of video game developers by examining specific bonus characteristics that align with advice derived from expectancy theory. We also investigated if bonuses encouraged or discouraged moral engagement and corner‐cutting behavior through their effects on work motivation as conceptualized through self‐determination theory. Company data on bonus characteristics coupled with surveys from 1024 game developers in a video game company indicated that the size of the last received bonus did not influence current work motivation. Uncertain probability of getting the next bonus installment was related to a lack of motivation, while more certain probability was related to higher intrinsic motivation. The probable size of the next bonus was related to lower external regulation and to higher intrinsic motivation, contrary to predictions from most motivation theories. Both probability certainty and bonus size probability were indirectly negatively associated with moral disengagement and corner‐cutting behaviors via decreasing amotivation and external regulation. Overall, results show that the bonus system in this company had limited effects on motivation and on discouraging deviant behaviors and point to how such systems can be improved using advice from theory.