Winner or Winner's Curse? Do CEOs and Companies Benefit From Internal Competition
研究了美国银行控股公司CEO内部继任事件中，锦标赛结构特征如何影响赢家薪酬溢价，以及薪酬溢价与后续银行绩效的关系。
ABSTRACT We investigate whether features of the tournament structure determine the cross‐sectional variation in the pay premiums of tournament winners and whether the level of rewards for tournament winners is related to future firm performance. Using a unique data set of 116 internal Chief Executive Officer (CEO) succession events in US bank holding companies, we find that the winner's pay premium level is positively associated with the steepness of the tournament structure before CEO succession. Higher pay premiums reflect the new CEO's managerial ability as perceived by shareholders and are also associated with greater improvements in bank performance following CEO succession.