Clientelism and programmatic redistribution: Evidence from a conjoint survey experiment in Brazil
通过巴西市议员选举的联合实验，研究选民如何奖惩混合使用庇护主义（如买票）和纲领性再分配（如社保）的候选人，发现庇护主义总体降低支持，但提供工作的庇护惩罚较轻，低收入选民更宽容。
In real-world elections, voters mostly do not face a choice between ’good’ or ’bad’ candidates but rather between candidates who attempt to mobilize electoral support by mixing normatively desirable policies on issues like social protection with normatively undesirable practices like vote buying. In this paper, we study how voters reward or punish candidates who differ in their mix of clientelistic and programmatic distribution. We gather evidence from a conjoint experiment of voter preferences for city councilors in Brazil. Our findings show that clientelism negatively affects voter support, even when candidates add programmatic redistribution to their policy platform. However, clientelism involving offering work is punished less harshly and may even make candidates more electorally viable. Low-income voters, in particular, are more lenient towards clientelistic distribution involving work when it is combined with pro-poor programmatic distribution. Our findings help explain why politicians continue to use certain types of clientelism and how these are paired with programmatic redistribution to mobilize voter support.