The 2024 Belgian and Hungarian Presidencies of the Council of the EU in Comparison: From an Honest Broker to a Dogmatic Disruptor
比较2024年比利时和匈牙利担任欧盟理事会轮值主席国的表现，分析两国在政治背景、自我定位和优先事项上的差异，评估其成就与失败，指出匈牙利代表了一种由强硬疑欧派政府主导的新型主席国。
As a member of the Trio Presidency with Spain and Hungary, Belgium took over the post of the rotating presidency for the 13th time in the first half of 2024, followed by Hungary for the second time since its EU accession in 2004. The legislative agendas and operational flexibility of both presidencies were heavily influenced by the 2024 elections to the European Parliament (EP) scheduled between 6 and 9 June. Notably, the Belgian presidency concluded with the elections, whilst the Hungarian presidency began amid the institutional transition following the elections. As members of the same Trio Presidency, Belgium, Hungary and Spain had committed to a few overarching thematic priorities. Their joint programme pledged to deepen the single market to increase competitiveness, to strengthen the area of freedom, security and justice internally and externally, to build a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe, to promote Europe's interest in the world (e.g., by continued support to Ukraine, strengthening the EU's defence and security capacities and promoting enlargement) and, finally, to adopt and implement the EU's Strategic Agenda for 2024–2029 (General Secretariat of the Council, 2023). However, despite these commitments and the significance of the upcoming EP elections for both, the two presidencies could not have been more different: whilst the Belgian presidency acted as a model honest broker and facilitator of European interests, the Hungarian presidency became a constant irritant and a dogmatic disruptor of common EU policies. This article outlines the political contexts as well as the self-ascribed roles and priorities of both presidencies and assesses their respective achievements and failures. It argues that the Hungarian presidency represents a new type of presidency: for the first time in EU history, the position was filled by a hard Eurosceptic and radical right-wing populist government, which had been challenging the EU's legal and political foundations for years and continued to do so whilst serving as the rotating presidency. In comparison with the Belgian presidency, which was committed to the European agenda and acted as an honest broker, the Hungarian government leveraged the presidency to challenge the EU and its policies and to promote its domestic foreign policy objectives. Content-wise, the Belgian presidency focused on the finalisation of EU legislation and measures that addressed current challenges to the EU (such as those related to the single market, green transition or support to Ukraine), whereas the Hungarian presidency's thematic priorities, especially the focus on countering illiberal migration and demographic challenges, reflected the government's domestic political agenda. The Treaty of Lisbon has significantly changed the rotating presidency's role and responsibilities. First, the establishment of a permanent President of the European Council has reduced the rotating presidency's tasks to the Council of the EU, confining its power mainly to internal representation, that is, vis-à-vis the European Parliament and Commission. Second, it lost all competences related to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the right to chair Foreign Affairs Council meetings. Finally, a Trio Presidency was introduced, mandating its three members to draft a joint programme to ensure legislative continuity (Batory and Puetter, 2013; Coman et al., 2024, 13ff.). Whilst this sparked a scholarly debate on the legislative power of the presidency post-Lisbon (e.g., Harwood, 2024), a consensus remains that the presidency retains significant agenda-setting and agenda-shaping powers, as it can prioritise, slow down or accelerate legislative files (Häge, 2017; Tallberg, 2003). According to the Presidency's Handbook, the rotating presidency is tasked with four major responsibilities: (1) planning, co-ordinating and chairing meetings of the Council and its preparatory bodies, (2) fostering compromises as ‘honest broker’, (3) representing the Council in its relations with the Commission, the Parliament and other institutions and (4) negotiating legislative files on behalf of the Council (trialogues) (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 9). Whilst these predefined tasks impose institutional constraints on the presidency's actions, the government's conduct of the presidency depends on various domestic and external contextual factors. Domestic factors include the (in)stability of the government, the size and capacities of the member state holding the presidency and the attitude of the government (i.e., whether Eurosceptic or Europhile). External factors encompass EP elections, the relationship with the other trio members, intra-EU crises and unforeseen events or crises (Kočí and Antal, 2025). Of particular relevance is the behavioural dimension, that is, how the government holding the presidency perceives its own role. Governments may either act as honest brokers, setting aside national preferences and aiming to contribute to the EU's collective interests. Or they can act as ‘self-centred presidents’, advancing their own priorities, including in foreign policy, even in the absence of formal powers (Mehlhausen and Karolewski, 2014, 14ff.). Theoretically, we may expect that Europhile governments are more inclined to act as honest brokers, whilst Eurosceptic governments may view themselves as self-centred presidencies. However, literature suggests two crucial factors that could mitigate the influence of Eurosceptic governments. The first is the separation of the position of the President of the European Council from the presidency of the Council of the EU after Lisbon, which diminishes the incentive for governments to exploit the position for domestic profiling. This weakened link between the presidency and domestic politics could hence lead to a depoliticisation of the presidency (Leconte, 2012, 142f.). Second, the ‘Brussels model’, that is, the crucial role of civil servants and diplomats socialised in Brussels, could neutralise the influence of Eurosceptic governments (Coman, 2020). Finally, the rotating presidency's performance is also contingent upon the political credibility and reputation of member states and their governments (Quaglia and Moxon-Browne, 2006, p. 362). A government recognised for fostering compromise solutions is more credible as an honest broker compared to one known for its confrontational approach. Belgium, as a founding member of the EU's predecessor, has held the presidency multiple times, the last one being in 2010, shortly after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. This made Belgium one of the first countries to serve in a reconfigured institutional system, where the presidency's role underwent considerable change (see Drieskens, 2011; van de Voorde, 2012). In 2024, under Prime Minister Alexander De Croo, the Belgian government took over ‘at a watershed moment’ (Permanent Representation of Belgium to the European Union, 2024), just ahead of the EP elections and the subsequent institutional transition. In addition, federal elections were also scheduled for June 2024. Consequently, the presidency coincided with both the end of the current government and a domestic election campaign. Whilst the national election campaign did not affect the presidency (de Brouwer, 2024), the end of the EU's legislative cycle and the anticipated Hungarian presidency crucially influenced its actions. For one, it was uncertain whether a new European Parliament with potentially strengthened right-wing forces would continue work on pending legislative files, particularly on controversial ones such as the EU's Green Deal. Additionally, the forthcoming Hungarian presidency, led by a government notorious for its obstructive and anti-EU stance, was anticipated to complicate policy-making processes and obstruct decisions. As a result, the Belgian presidency positioned itself as a facilitator of unfinished legislative work, support for war-torn Ukraine and the upcoming negotiations surrounding key EU positions – the Presidents of the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council. Accordingly, Prime Minister De Croo's ‘goal [was] to deliver’ and finalise as many of the 150 open legislative files as possible by June (Permanent Representation of Belgium to the European Union, 2024), thereby limiting the Hungarian presidency's opportunities to impede EU decisions. In line with this, the Belgian presidency identified its role as that of an honest broker. De Croo announced to ‘take a sober approach to [their] presidency, focusing on finding solutions and eliminating obstacles’, and the presidency kept underlining that Belgium's culture of compromise, rooted in the country's linguistic and territorial diversity, made Belgium the perfect mediator (Griera, 2025). The presidency's programme ‘Protect, Strengthen, Prepare’ reflected this ambition by largely referring to the completion of legislation in six priority areas: (1) defending the rule of law, democracy and unity; (2) strengthening competitiveness; (3) pursuing a green and just transition; (4) reinforcing the EU's social and health agenda; (5) protecting people and borders; and (6) promoting a global Europe (Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2024a). Thematically, these topics were closely aligned with the Trio Presidency's objectives. Ultimately, the presidency concluded 74 agreements and reached 57 Council negotiation mandates (Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2024b), successfully delivering on its promise. Many of these agreements were on issues that had stalled in the Council for years, often due to resistance from France, Germany or Italy (e.g., Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive or Directive on improving working conditions in platform work). In the first priority area, the presidency achieved final approval for two acts meant to safeguard media and journalistic freedom in the EU: the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which establishes binding regulations for national media systems, and the Directive on strategic lawsuits against public participation (Anti-SLAPP Directive), aimed at enhancing protection for journalists against abusive court proceedings often initiated by powerful actors such as governments (Priebus, 2025, 7f.). Additionally, the presidency organised a discussion on ways to strengthen the rule of law and democracy in member and candidate states, based on a report by International IDEA (International IDEA, 2024). The presidency also organised a hearing in the ongoing Article 7 (1) procedure against Hungary in June and facilitated the termination of the Article 7 procedure against Poland in May, following the new Polish government's presentation of its Action Plan for Restoring the Rule of Law in February 2024 in the Council. Highlighting the significance on the protection of democracy and the rule of law from internal and external threats, the presidency adopted the Council conclusions on democratic resilience: safeguarding electoral processes from foreign interference and the Council conclusions on enhancing and protecting free, open and informed democratic debate. In the area of competitiveness, the presidency struck an agreement with the Parliament to reform the Stability and Growth Pact, introducing more flexibility to its preventive arm. Furthermore, it secured approval for the Net-Zero Industry Act, meant to support clean technologies in the EU, alongside legislation concerning the circular economy, notably the Right to Repair Directive and the Construction Products Regulation. Addressing challenges related to digitalisation, the Belgian presidency managed to get its compromise text of the Artificial Intelligence Act approved, the first rule book on AI worldwide (Council of the European Union, 2023). Moreover, the presidency reached a consensus with the Parliament regarding the Cyber Solidarity Act, aimed at enhancing EU capacities to respond to cyber threats. Lastly, the presidency concluded several files linked to the completion of the Capital Markets Union. In the area of green and just transition, the presidency managed to secure the Nature Restoration Law, after support in the Council in February due to 2024). It also reached a on the reform of European legislation and an agreement on the to its social and health an agreement on the Directive on improving working conditions in platform work was which the working conditions of people working for (e.g., Belgium had to negotiations after the compromise was 2024). an agreement on the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive was which with more and a of more for on the and as well as its the protection of people and the of the controversial on and (see and of the the of Finally, in the area of the of a global Europe, the new and Growth for the was aimed at concerning the rule of law and democracy in the which with the presidency's on enhancing democracy and the rule of law EU member and candidate for Ukraine was also a priority for the presidency, particularly due to the that the Hungarian presidency would obstruct concerning In the Hungarian government the Ukraine and its to In Belgium secured a negotiation from the Council and reached an agreement with the Parliament on the after EU Hungarian Prime Minister to 2024). Additionally, the Belgian presidency facilitated accession by the negotiation and the first with Ukraine on June. Furthermore, the presidency adopted the negotiation for followed by the first with the these policy the presidency also the European Council negotiations on the three EU positions and the EU's Strategic Agenda for 2024–2029 (de Brouwer, 2024). However, a few files including the Council conclusions on the Common Policy the on by new to and the of the and its first Council presidency in which was by Hungary was to the presidency for the second time in 2024. the of Prime Minister four governments have been in power since this government continuity as an that Hungary could upon its second presidency 2023). However, the domestic and foreign policy in Hungary had changed since First, despite controversial domestic the first presidency Hungary was a democracy in that the and and political led to a significant Hungary from a of the to an and 2024). 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