Pandering in the Shadows: How Natural Disasters Affect Special Interest Politics
利用自然灾害的准随机发生时间，研究发现灾害转移了媒体和公众对政治的注意力，导致议员更可能支持特殊利益集团，表明公众关注能改善选举问责。
We exploit the quasi-random timing of natural disasters to study the connection between public attention to politics and legislators’ support for special interests. We show that when a disaster strikes, the news media reduce coverage of politics in general and of individual legislators in particular, and members of the House of Representatives become significantly more likely to adopt special interest donors’ positions. The evidence implies that politicians are more inclined to take actions benefiting special interests when the public is distracted. More broadly, our findings suggest that attention to politics improves electoral accountability even in an environment with stringent transparency requirements.