Too Much, Too Soon, for Too Long: The Dynamics of Competitive Executive Compensation
构建了一个动态道德风险的一般均衡模型，研究高管薪酬设计。模型显示，由于企业忽视自身薪酬设计对高管外部选择权的影响，均衡结果导致高管薪酬过高、支付过早、任期过长，偏离股东价值最大化。
ABSTRACT We examine executive compensation in a general equilibrium model with dynamic moral hazard, where executives' outside options are endogenously determined by equilibrium market compensation. Firms provide incentives through compensation packages featuring deferred payments as “carrots” and termination as “sticks.” Crucially, the effectiveness of termination as an incentive device is undermined by the outside options available to executives. As individual firms fail to internalize the effect of their compensation design on these endogenous outside options, the equilibrium is generally inefficient. Compared to shareholder‐value‐maximizing compensation packages, executives are paid too much, too soon, and keep their jobs for too long.