Unraveling and Inefficient Matching
研究了劳动力市场提前招聘（unraveling）的动因，发现次级市场的存在及其透明度是关键因素：透明度高时提前招聘消失，但低层级企业为表明未招到顶尖工人而导致的信号扭曲仍使匹配低效。
Labor markets unravel when workers and firms match inefficiently early under limited information. I argue that a significant determinant of unraveling is the presence of a secondary market, where firms can poach workers, and its transparency: how well firms can ascertain workers' value once they are employed by competitors. While early hiring reduces the probability of hiring a high-type worker, it prevents rivals from learning about the worker, making poaching difficult. When secondary markets are very transparent, unraveling disappears. However, the matching remains inefficient due to the incentives of low-tier firms to communicate that they have not hired top-quality workers.