Mergers, Entry, and Consumer Welfare
研究了差异化产品价格竞争背景下，合并引发的进入如何影响消费者福利，并刻画了能抵消反竞争效应的效率与进入者质量组合。
We model merger-induced entry in the context of differentiated-products price competition. We fully characterize the combinations of merger efficiencies and entrant qualities that can mitigate the adverse equilibrium welfare effects of an otherwise anticompetitive merger. The possibility of merger-induced entry introduces nonmonotonicity into the equilibrium value that consumers receive from merger efficiencies, potentially necessitating the joint analysis of efficiencies and entry in merger review. We also explicitly characterize the efficiencies required for merger-induced entrants to make profitable mergers consumer surplus neutral. We provide an empirical application to the T-Mobile/Sprint merger.