Contracting Environments and Efficiency in Markets with Hidden Information: An Experiment
通过实验首次系统分析契约环境如何影响隐藏信息市场的效率，发现竞争在私有价值和共同价值市场中的作用不同，且共同价值市场中均衡行为程度很高。
This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the role of contracting environments on market outcomes and efficiency in markets with hidden information using experimental methods. When markets are plagued by hidden information, competition does not necessarily ensure efficient market outcomes. This crucially depends on the nature of the hidden information. We present a parsimonious experimental design that serves to compare the different contracting environments for both types of hidden information markets, private and common values. The degree of equilibrium play that we find is strikingly high, particularly in the complex cases of competitive common values markets.