Bidding for Contracts under Uncertain Demand: Skewed Bidding and Risk Sharing
研究了采购项目中投标人如何通过倾斜投标平衡风险暴露，发现高效和低效投标人都会提交低价倾斜投标，并利用拍卖数据验证了风险平衡和机会主义行为。
ABSTRACT Procurement projects often involve substantial uncertainty in inputs at the time of contracting. Whether the procurer or contractor assumes such risk depends on the specific contractual agreement. We develop a model of auction contracts where bidders have multidimensional private information. Bidders balance skewed bidding and risk exposure; both efficient and inefficient bidders submit a low bid via skewed bidding. We document evidence of i) risk‐balancing behavior through bid portfolio formation and ii) opportunistic behavior via skewed bidding using auction data. Counterfactual experiments suggest the onus of bearing project risk should fall on the procurer (contractor) when project risk is large (small).