Corporate shareholdings, tax‐loss selling, and the (mis)pricing of information asymmetry
研究发现，公司持股分布与信息不对称定价的关系仅出现在一月，且随亏损卖出潜力增加而增强，表明这反映的是错误定价而非风险补偿。
Abstract We examine the extent to which the distribution of corporate shareholdings affects seasonality in realized returns and the resulting implications for the conditions under which information asymmetry (IA) appears to be priced. Earlier studies have found that IA attracts a return premium only for firms with low competition for their stock, as proxied by the number of common shareholders or the number and concentration of institutional holdings. However, we demonstrate that the association between these proxies for competition and the pricing of IA is restricted to the month of January, is increasing in the potential for tax‐loss selling, concentrates in the first days of the tax year, and exists regardless of firms' fiscal year‐end dates. Overall, our evidence suggests that the association between the distribution of shareholdings and the pricing of IA reflects variation in mispricing arising from tax‐loss selling rather than compensation for the risk of trading at an information disadvantage.