Federal Reserve Chairs and Monetary Regimes
提出体制依赖格兰杰因果检验新方法，分析1965-2019年美国货币政策体制与美联储主席任期的关系，发现泰勒规则在1965-2004年主导，而货币反馈规则在1984-2019年更突出，金融危机是关键转折点。
ABSTRACT This paper extends prior research by introducing a novel econometric framework—Regime‐Dependent Granger Causality—to analyse the systematic elements of United States (US) monetary policy. Using vector autoregressive models allowing for temporary Granger causality, we examine the association between monetary policy regimes—Taylor rules and Monetary Feedback rules—and the tenures of Federal Reserve Chairs. The analysis identifies the Global Financial Crisis period as a critical juncture. Taylor rule regimes predominated between 1965 and 2004, whereas Monetary Feedback regimes became more prominent from 1984 to 2019, with notable deviations during the Burns–Miller tenure and post‐2004 under Bernanke. Monte Carlo simulations affirm the robustness of these findings. The study underscores the increasing relevance of Monetary Feedback rules in understanding the evolving nature of systematic US monetary policy, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis.