Picking the right signals? Investor assessment of reputation signals of entrepreneurial teams and distributors in project-based enterprises
研究投资者在评估项目型企业时，如何错误解读创业团队和分销商的声誉信号，发现团队声誉更能吸引投资但分销商声誉更能预测成功，对理解高风险创业投资有启示。
Abstract Signaling theory posits that investors rely on quality signals from entrepreneurial teams (ETs) to assess their capacity to build successful new ventures. We examine how accurately investors evaluate these signals when funding project-based enterprises (PBEs)—temporary, single-purpose ventures characterized by extreme uncertainty. In this context, investors face challenges in interpreting signals from both ETs and their affiliated distributors promoting PBEs’ product. Short project lifecycles limit investors’ ability to monitor ET behavior, while distributors face rapidly shifting consumer preferences. Studying the film industry, we investigate how the commercial reputations of ETs and distributors influence investment in PBEs, as well as PBEs’ subsequent commercial success. We reveal a disconnect: ET reputation is a stronger predictor of investment than of commercial success. In contrast, distributor reputation more reliably predicts commercial success, though it is overlooked by investors. These results suggest that investors may misinterpret key reputation signals, making a separating equilibrium between high- and low-quality PBEs unlikely. We contribute to signaling theory by highlighting the misalignment between signals that attract investment and those that predict success in high-uncertainty, project-based ventures.