Pay Transparency and Inventor Productivity: Evidence From State‐Level Pay Secrecy Laws
利用美国各州逐步通过薪酬保密法的自然实验，研究发现薪酬透明度提升显著提高了企业发明者的生产率，尤其对少数族裔发明者激励更强，并促进了团队多样性和晋升追求。
Abstract We examine the role of pay transparency in inventor productivity by exploiting the staggered adoption of state‐level pay secrecy laws, which enhance pay transparency in the workplace. We find a significant increase in inventor productivity of firms located in states that have passed such laws relative to firms elsewhere. This relation is more pronounced for firms in states with lower levels of pre‐existing pay transparency. We further show that pay secrecy laws promote inventor productivity by motivating inventors—especially minority inventors—to exert more effort, enhancing the diversity of inventor teams, and encouraging all inventors to pursue promotions.