Board Co‐Option and Workplace Safety
研究发现董事会中由CEO选任的董事比例越高，企业工伤/疾病率越高，原因是安全投入减少和工作负荷加重，而外部监督可缓解此负面效应。
ABSTRACT We investigate the effect of board co‐option on workplace safety and find that firms with a higher proportion of co‐opted directors on their boards experience higher workplace injury/illness rates. We also explore how board co‐option may increase workplace injury/illness rates and attribute that to lower investments in safety measures and heavier workloads. Further analyses reveal that external monitoring through greater institutional ownership and analyst coverage can moderate the negative effect of board co‐option on workplace safety. Our results support the argument that the interests of co‐opted directors are closely aligned with those of the CEO, who is instrumental in their selection, thereby compromising their monitoring role.