Lobbying for cheaper inputs? Political economy of export taxation
扩展了Grossman和Helpman模型，研究下游企业如何游说对中间品征收出口税以降低自身成本，而上游企业则反对。利用16国产品级数据验证了游说激励对出口税设定的显著影响。
This paper investigates the political economy determinants of export taxes using a theoretical framework, which extends the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model to account for input-output linkages and lobbying by both intermediate and final goods producers. The model predicts that downstream industries may lobby for export taxes on intermediate goods to reduce domestic input costs, while upstream sectors counter-lobby against such measures. We test this prediction using product-level data covering 16 countries, combining information on export taxes, input requirements, production, and trade elasticities. The results provide robust evidence that lobbying incentives significantly influence the imposition of export taxes.