Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel under market entry in competing supply chains
研究了在位制造商和零售商在竞争者进入市场时，是否应通过平台引入市场渠道来提升竞争力，以及谁应主导引入，发现低佣金率和弱竞争有利于引入，且该策略对在位企业有利但损害进入者。
In response to competitors’ market entry, incumbent enterprises usually introduce marketplace channels through platforms to increase market share and enhance competitiveness. In this article, we construct competing supply chains and investigate whether the incumbent manufacturer and retailer have incentives to introduce marketplace channels through the platform, and if so, who should take the lead. Four introduction strategies are constructed: the incumbent manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both introduce the marketplace channel. The results show that in the context of market entry, a lower commission rate and weaker competition incentivize the incumbent manufacturer and retailer to introduce marketplace channels. More importantly, this channel introduction strategy can achieve a win-win or win-win-win situation for incumbent enterprises (i.e., the incumbent manufacturer, the retailer, and the platform), but it is always detrimental to the entrant manufacturer. In addition, the platform tends to endorse the incumbent manufacturer’s introduction, while it encourages the retailer to introduce under weak competition. As competition intensifies, the whole supply chain’s preference would shift from both introduction strategy to either introducing and finally culminating in the neither introduce case. Finally, we further examine scenarios in which the entrant manufacturer sells products under the reselling mode and a sequential game.