The Formation of the Second von der Leyen Commission: Nomination, Organisation and Confirmation
本文分析了2024年第二届冯德莱恩委员会组建过程，涵盖总统提名、委员遴选、内部组织及欧洲议会确认，揭示了委员会政治化和总统制化的趋势，对研究欧盟治理的学者有参考价值。
The appointment of a new Commission is a major event in the institutional and political life of the European Union (EU). It begins immediately after the European Parliament (EP) elections, when the European Council nominates (or re-nominates) a Commission president, and ends several months later when the European Council appoints the Commission for a 5-year period. In the meantime, the EP votes on the nominee for President; national governments nominate their would-be Commissioners; the President allocates portfolios amongst the Commissioners-designate; and the EP holds confirmation hearings for each Commissioner-designate before holding a vote of approval on the College as a whole. This article examines how events unfolded in 2024, resulting in the formation of the second Commission of Ursula von der Leyen. It does so in the context of the increasing politicisation of the process and presidentialisation of the Commission, notably following a series of revisions introduced in the treaties of Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001), and Lisbon (2007). As a result of those and other changes, the Commission President is far more than merely ‘primus inter pares’ in the College (Ross and Jenson, 2017, p. 117). The authority of the President has grown especially because of the personalisation of the presidential appointment process, the recognition of the President's political leadership role, including the President's ability to shape and structure the College (Kassim et al., 2017, p. 659). The article first develops the three main elements of politicisation in the process of forming a new Commission, focusing particularly on the nomination of the President through the lead candidate procedure; the President's increasing control over the Commission, ranging from the nomination of Commissioners-designate to the internal organisation of the College, including the allocation of portfolios; and the EP's confirmation of the College. It then looks specifically at von der Leyen's re-nomination and re-election, the construction of her new College, the EP confirmation hearings and vote of approval and the appointment of the new Commission. The conclusion summarises the key developments in the formation of the second von der Leyen Commission and their significance for EU governance. Commission politicisation is manifested in many ways, including the composition of the College, which increasingly comprises political ‘heavyweights’ (Hartlapp, 2015), and the rising influence of elected or appointed politicians in decision-making processes at the expense of bureaucrats and officials (De Wilde, 2011, p. 561). Another indicator of politicisation is the EP's increasing control over the Commission, making the latter more accountable to the former (Wille, 2013). Party politics, which traditionally played only a minor role in the Commission (Egeberg, 2006; Peterson, 1999; Wonka, 2008), are becoming increasingly important; the growing influence of (national and European) parties and partisan conflict is also seen as a sign of the Commission's politicisation (De Wilde, 2011, p. 561). Overall, the process of appointing the Commission has increasingly involved the President-elect and become more politicised not least because the EP's role has grown, with the College having to undergo a vetting process. This section contextualises the nomination and appointment of the second von der Leyen Commission by exploring the three main avenues of Commission presidentialisation and politicisation in recent years. In 2014, the European political parties, with the EP's support, introduced a new procedure for the nomination of the Commission President, based on the EP's interpretation of Article 17.7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), an innovation of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Council would still make the nomination – a responsibility enshrined in the treaty – but, according to the EP, would have to nominate a Spitzenkandidat (lead candidate) of one of the European political parties, chosen by the EP's leadership based on the results of the preceding EP elections. The EP's insistence on the new procedure was an affront to the European Council but was not surprising. Indeed, the EP's institutional assertiveness was well known. As Crum pointed out, the ‘EP-centred parliamentarisation thesis’ – the idea that the EP is remorseless in its acquisition of new power with a view to establishing an EP-based government – has ‘dominated our understanding of EU inter-institutional politics’ (Crum, 2023). If seen only as a struggle between the European Council and the EP, then the EP won the Spitzenkandidaten battle in 2014 but lost in 2019. That is because, in 2014, a Spitzenkandidat (Jean-Claude Juncker) became Commission President, but in 2019, none of the Spitzenkandidaten did. A more sophisticated analysis would consider the circumstances in each case, such as the make-up of the European Council (notably the balance of political parties to which its members belong), the backgrounds and political experience of the lead candidates themselves and the decisiveness and unity of the EP in 2014 in promptly proposing its agreed-upon Spitzenkandidat compared with its indecisiveness in 2019. Moreover, the purpose of the new process was not only, or indeed primarily, to challenge the power of the European Council but to increase the EP's influence over the Commission (Kaniok and Hamřík, 2019; Reiding and Meijer, 2018), to strengthen the President's legitimacy by means of electoral accountability (Dinan, 2015; Kassim, 2017; Westlake, 2016) and to encourage voters to take a greater interest in the EP elections by personalising the contest for President and sharpening electoral competition (Follesdal and Hix, 2006, p. 553). Taking all that into account, the results of the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2014, let alone in 2019, were disappointing for the EP. Nonetheless, the process did (party-)politicise the Commission President's appointment procedure. The President has acquired the right to decide on the internal organisation of the College, to allocate and reshuffle portfolios and to dismiss College members. The President also has a say over who joins the team. Originally, nominating Commissioners was entirely a national prerogative. Over time, the President's influence grew, to the point that ‘The Council, by common accord with the President-elect, shall adopt the list of the other persons whom it proposes for appointment as members of the Commission’ (Article 17.7 TEU). That provision gives the President a soft veto over national candidates – a veto that so far has not been formally exercised (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015, p. 78). Traditionally, appointing Commissioners was a way for member states to exert influence over Commission decision-making (Pollack, 1997). Therefore, governments typically selected candidates whose policy stances aligned with their own preferences, often choosing individuals from their own political parties (Crombez, 1997; Wonka, 2007). There is an increasing tendency towards the nomination of candidates who have held senior political offices, such as government minister or even national leader, rather than administrative positions, before joining the Commission. On the whole, the number of Commissioners with backgrounds in diplomacy, academia or public administration has declined, and those with previous political roles, legitimated through an electoral process, have increased (Hartlapp, 2015, p. 149). The number of Commissioners remains tied to the number of member states. Having a large Commission gives the President leverage to exert leadership, with more centralisation of decision-making and less influence for individual Commissioners being ‘unavoidable’ in an EU of what is now 27 member states (Wille, 2013, p. 65). But it has also created a challenge for the President: how to give 25 College members – excluding the President and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, who is also a Commission Vice-President – meaningful jobs with adequate administrative, financial and political resources. José Manuel Barroso (2004–2014) was the first President faced with a Commission of 28 following Central and Eastern European enlargement in 2004–2007 and Croatia's accession in 2013 and the first to have presidentialised the internal Commission procedures (Kassim, 2022, p. 114). However, Juncker was the first to reorganise the College to address the challenge of an oversized College by introducing a new role for the Vice-Presidents (VPs), one that was policy-steering rather than policy-making. The VPs oversaw project teams, bringing together Commissioners with related portfolios. In her first College, von der Leyen continued that approach but appointed both Vice-Presidents and Executive Vice-Presidents. The EP has tried to exert political influence over the Commission through the Spitzenkandidaten process, with mixed results. Beyond that, the EP has multiple ways of exercising political control over the Commission during its mandate, such as parliamentary questions and visits of College members to plenary sessions or committee meetings. However, those actions can do little more than make the Commission uncomfortable. Besides, the EP's right to issue a motion of censure is more of a nuclear option than a practical means of exerting control. In fact, the EP wields the greatest power over the Commission before the latter takes office, as members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have the power of refusal on their side through their confirmation vote. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, the EP has had the right to approve the College as a whole. From that approval right, the EP derived the right to hold public hearings with each Commissioner-designate before taking its vote (Corbett et al., 2016, p. 250). Whilst not provided for in the EU Treaties, public hearings have been carried and are a 2015, p. The hearings to each for the by the of the College The individual hearings with members of all political in the EP a of The EP has a Commission which would a political In Commission Barroso the EP has or even its of the College on of individual was between the EP result and the political composition of the College control was over both the President and the College as a (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015, The first to the formation of the Commission in is how with to the Spitzenkandidaten process. 2024, national the of whom were in the European Party were to have von der the an in a second von der Leyen became the through the of in the to the EP elections but little for the elections, held on the the in the EP, by the – the of the Party of European – with The and the both lost and The with Whilst and parties did not as many as which were amongst three after the the European and the for and the of The as the Whilst the and other parties lost their the and the to the right the the and the still held a the became the key and major its the European nomination of von der Leyen an on held a after the elections, national her as of a for the positions, including the European Council President and the High of the of balance and member and political were the main The for the political parties before the for whose candidates in the elections, were not were of the whose candidates won as many as the but far than the or the on the continued amongst European Council between the European Council and the EP and amongst the political in the EP. As on 27 the European Council as President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen as candidate for President of the European Commission and to the candidate for High Council, The an von der Leyen and The only was that the had with von der Leyen over and was because the which was from the In the to nominate the Commission president, and der Leyen's in the EP was not but it to than in 2019. one in 2024, was a which provided a of had a of from her first was not of for or was on the of with her own notably its – the was that many on the her of which had after the of and for her of EU and many on the right her of the European The of the far right in the EP elections and the of her had their when von der Leyen her for in a at the EP plenary on the event was der Leyen was and to and the for more public and and and and but played the increasingly European a of her first Commission. to the EP's institutional von der Leyen treaty and the EP a right of as had in 2019. in 2019, von der Leyen did not the Spitzenkandidaten process. The of in the were or But the that the later that was by der Leyen to at least her a of It was than in 2019, when in then was that von der Leyen was a the EP with her as the EP was in a the European Council, which had as as 2014 to with to the of the Spitzenkandidaten process. the European Council to adopt the the and for the 5-year institutional In the European Council its of political and of the EU (Article TEU). the would take over the Commission President's political even the President by of being a It was not that the European Council Commission President-elect von der Leyen to a of its in 2019, before became President for the first in that The purpose was to von der Leyen that the European Council alone the its on 27 2024, the European Council not only von der Leyen for a second as Commission President but also the after the von der Leyen that the new provided a for the of her second of political which would to the EP of its vote on her der the EP a less approach towards the European Council the Spitzenkandidaten process. Having and elected a in 2019, the EP was in a of when it for a with the European Council, so that the European Council would for the EP a common in with the to in Article 17.7 and the of 2023). The European Council the EP's the process of nominating von der Leyen in 2024, its to the EP was the European Council would according to its interpretation of Article 17.7 and would not the EP to issue a The so far that the European Council is not to nominating a Spitzenkandidat for Commission but is in the of the especially how well the candidate into the of national are to the of candidates for Commission only to The European political parties are to and the EP is to but the European Council is not to nominate one of Beyond its significance for European it is to the of the Spitzenkandidaten process in it to the in compared to von der Leyen's legitimacy because was a her of in the of to her as a the of it is not for the Spitzenkandidaten to a more than a of member the and other As it the of the was with only and from von der who had the of and was well the Spitzenkandidaten became have more interest in the elections than have been the The that the Spitzenkandidaten process has not as its does not that it is a it is to have lead candidates for the of Commission in the EP elections, to have EU during the and to have their for by the European But the of one or other of those candidates on the of the European Council, not only on the make-up of the elected EP. a rather than a the European Council, the EP and the European political parties make the of an but not institutional There are elements in together a new the nomination of the candidates and the internal and organisation of the College. In 2024, von der Leyen to exert control over the composition of her College by that national governments and were an government only and only that governments were to von der Leyen's a more was political in as the President had a to nominate a in as the government had to a the in a in as the of had to with the of In other as or parliamentary approval was in many governments a candidate following political and were to their As a it was for von der Leyen to in her first College which was the Commission to second was In an to more von der Leyen held with several which in and their candidates with her second Commission der Leyen did not have to take the of her soft veto power over the composition of the College. the circumstances the nomination process and did not to governments with which to during the years. after the having all the von der Leyen to her by the and candidate for a second The was surprising. had been of von der and the were at by the of her first The that President a new an public of von der Leyen's Whilst have that, in von der Leyen to a from her at the her the that von der Leyen did not to with whom and for a second Moreover, von der Leyen by exercising a power greater than a the authority to allocate and portfolios. that would and which was indeed the the of the College national governments the of appointing individuals with political experience from elected The College former to in her first three former and and former the number as in her first There were from her first compared to from Juncker to von der Leyen the second von der Leyen College one from the and three amongst who was not formally with but was seen as rather than a Whilst the number of Commissioners from von der Leyen's previous the to as other to its the or would a The was to in her first which it the College to many members have held positions, to less in their political and less in their The of College members as an indicator of In her first von der Leyen elements of the Juncker but introduced a of three Executive Vice-Presidents and Vice-Presidents The of those the were with institutional such as a and such as the European and the VPs with portfolios and and often it to and their of the major of von der Leyen's first College was the in Commissioners had little to were the time, von der Leyen power in her own with the of a of In her second von der Leyen to 2019, had more and experience to the College to her and to it even more as an for the centralisation of in with the towards Commission presidentialisation (Kassim, and A from her first was to the was to each with a der Leyen introduced three new the a to and focusing on and and the Commission's to the the new and portfolios when making her for at the EP plenary in 2024, to address EP and von der Leyen was for a of policy with multiple members on key such as or the were becoming increasingly in Juncker by policy to the VPs and establishing von der Leyen's approach the with even the portfolios being less The of and which was Juncker and became far more in von der Leyen's von der Leyen's own in the College, von der Leyen would the and Moreover, in her first were or in her second especially following the of and the of and In 2019, von der Leyen a in the College. The three the three political der Leyen approach in her second establishing a political the of having only members in the College the positions, as did the The one in to von der Leyen being in the to the of the the EP, the also an address the von der Leyen of the to As the and allocation of portfolios is to presidential not least because the President with member states on of all governments and Commissioners-designate portfolios that a of EU or EU and administrative support, notably a portfolios of and the and are also that the EU has in those are and through which the EU of its In 2024, enlargement was on the making it a the was after in 2024, to the for the It was that not national government would what it the were which a competition policy with and and an The states were also seen as became a by of being the High Commission a and former the had for a but the who responsibility for and the whose was one of the least portfolios and not because of the but because its held elected and was the of of its nominee a in the of the new College. on 2024, von der Leyen her new and the of In what as an affront to the EP, of her second College in a with the political and in a right The in a new Commission takes in the EP, the College is as a to a vote of (Article 17.7 TEU). In 2024, the EP confirmation hearings for the to the growing number of increasingly and hearings than of the hearings in were by or more compared to in and in 2014, when were 27 preceding hearings in were by an three or The EP all the candidates even those or nominee and a from von der Leyen's first Commission, was the in 2024, because of a that merely as of being or having to undergo a second had only to a of questions following which is a of between the EP and Commission 2024, p. The EP to and the approval process, as have to candidate and the new Commission's a member of was also In to as a of the in the EP appointment as one of the the of the the The the increased of the confirmation process. Indeed, the of the the process had even the political amongst themselves that all candidates would This have been the to the to the new institutional in the of and the but it questions accountability and in during the second of the hearings when the Party to responsibility for the in Commissioner-designate not a the to the of the to of an appointment or to authority von der Leyen – or the and the to to their positions, with the and the Overall, the of the confirmation hearings in the make-up of the EP following the elections. the and not to with the far right, the of between the political a of the EP, increased The hearings were only or even the and power and have played a However, in 2024, the institutional of the EP, that to the political On 27 2024, the EP von der Leyen's second College by votes to with That to approval – the for a College and of a that is to the composition of the EP, have continued to The European Council the in forming the new Commission, on 28 2024, when it by procedure the European Commission for the from to Council, The second von der Leyen Commission on As a the new College a before the European of on 27 to the EU with and for the and the of as in Article Whilst the is not in the the to from the treaties and as as the new Commission is The formation of the second von der Leyen Commission was in several In with Article 17.7 von der Leyen's nomination between the European Council and the EP, which to the Spitzenkandidaten process as it had in 2014, when Juncker became In 2024, von der Leyen was indeed the Spitzenkandidat of the but only because it her of the national the Spitzenkandidaten process, to which the European Council The European Council on von der Leyen's as of a for the EU institutional Party political the the European Council was the EP to in its the more sophisticated of the of the Spitzenkandidaten process what was in to the that is in of inter-institutional in the In with the it that national governments over the of in the EU and of appointment to the EP (Crum, 2023). The EP's of von der Leyen the of the of the Commission's appointment process. the national governments their would-be traditionally member states when it to nominating von der Leyen influence over the process, not only through allocation but also by – and – the of the and nominee for a second That was less a power by von der than a to of a with whom was on it the of presidential the were the internal organisation of the College became a from her first von der Leyen the of VPs and only a political and the of portfolios created A and in the Juncker Commission, became even more von der Leyen to the It was from the and allocation of portfolios and the organisation of the College that von der Leyen to authority in her own Party have College but the of the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2014, have become even more A was in when also the internal a in Party also the EP's confirmation to the of the and a of the of the hearings in is the process the political that candidate would In 2024, for the first in the candidates by the and the over the of one from the and one from the who was by the Whilst the appointment of the new Commission it questions accountability and legitimacy in the EU of governance.