The History of Economics as Science Critique: Demystification and Its Limits
梳理了科学史与STS学者对经济学的科学批判，指出其不同于异端经济学对经济思想的批评，旨在揭示经济学科学性的建构性、偶然性与权力斗争，并评估这种批判在挑战经济学家政治权威时的价值与局限。
Abstract This article reconstructs the “science critique of economics” developed in recent decades by historians of science and science and technology studies (STS) scholars, showing that this critique is different in kind from, though not inconsistent with, the criticism of economic ideas pursued by heterodox economists. The science critique takes aim not at the truth value of what economists say but at the “scientific mystique” acquired by the discipline in the twentieth century. It demonstrates that for economists, like other scientists, being scientific does not entail access to value-neutrality or methodological infallibility. Scientific economics is structured by contingent and questionable metaphors, conceptual schemes, and paradigms; consists of conventional practices that reshape as well as reflect the world; and is engaged in struggles to secure professional prestige and authority. The article concludes by taking stock of this critique, arguing that while it can be a valuable device for challenging the excessive authority of economists in political decision-making, it risks overestimating how much the political influence of economists depends on the scientific mystique.