Choice flexibility and long-run cooperation
研究了在陌生人重复社会困境中，增加部分合作选择能否提升合作与效率。实验发现，在刚性二元选择中加入中间选项显著提高了合作水平，甚至接近伙伴配对的效果。
Abstract Cooperation does not empirically scale when strangers confront indefinitely repeated social dilemmas—despite its incentive-compatibility. Here, we investigate if an intervention can mitigate this problem: expanding the action set with partial cooperation choices. Although standard theory predicts no effect, adding interior choices to a rigid binary-choice game often boosted cooperation and efficiency in the laboratory. Under some conditions, groups of strangers achieved outcomes close to those observed in pairs of partners—where adding interior choices, instead, was inconsequential. This suggests that choice rigidities can hinder long-run cooperation.