Auctions for risk-averse non-profits
研究了十种拍卖格式在允许竞拍者内生参与时产生的收入分布的前两阶矩，发现存在稳健且显著的均值-方差权衡，并通过实验室和田野实验验证了该权衡的存在，为非营利组织优化筹款策略提供了机制多样化的见解。
Fundraising for non-profit organizations (NPOs) often involves converting in-kind donations into cash, commonly through charity auctions. However, little attention has been paid to the revenue distributions these mechanisms generate, an obvious concern for risk-averse NPOs deciding on a fundraising strategy. This paper introduces a theoretical framework that evaluates the first two moments of the revenue distributions accruing to ten auction formats under conditions that permit endogenous bidder participation. The resulting “revenue frontier” generated by these mechanisms reveals a robust and sizeable mean-variance tradeoff that NPOs should consider when selecting which mechanism(s) to employ. We test the model’s predictions for each auction format using both laboratory and field experiments and find evidence of a substantial (and similar) tradeoff in each setting. Additionally, we show how bidder participation can modulate an NPO’s risk exposure, conditional on the auction formats selected. These results offer important insights into how NPOs might optimize their fundraising strategies through methods of mechanism diversification.