Firm Responses to Tax Audits: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from a Threshold-Based Audit Program
利用中国增值税阈值审计计划，发现审计能显著增加税收收入，但大型企业会通过内部交易进行更激进的避税，部分企业甚至使用假发票。
Abstract This paper investigates the causal impact of audits on tax compliance by exploiting a threshold-based VAT desk audit program in China. All firms below the VAT-to-sales ratio threshold are contacted by the tax authority and must justify their tax returns through self-audits. We estimate the audit effect using the National Tax Survey Database and a regression discontinuity design. We find that desk audits recovered a significant amount of tax revenues, and audited firms reported more output taxes and input tax credits in the subsequent two years despite no changes in real production. A portion of the increased input tax credit is attributed to the acquisition of fake invoices. Interestingly, larger taxpayers remit less VAT after the audit. The audit triggers more aggressive tax planning by large firms. They use more intrafirm transactions to avoid VAT, with a more significant impact among those with an expansive subsidiary network.