Tâtonnement in matching markets
研究了无转移支付的匹配市场中，学校根据供需失衡调整录取分数线（cutoff）的试错过程，证明了在适度调整下市场会收敛到稳定匹配，否则可能循环但上下确界仍为市场出清。
I study tâtonnement processes in a matching market without transfers. In each period, schools set cutoffs, i.e., the preference ranks of the least preferred students they are willing to admit, and students accept their most preferred offers. Cutoffs are adjusted on the basis of demand–supply imbalances. A school's adjustment from one period to the next is moderate if it is bounded by the most recently observed imbalance at that school. I show that for any period in which all schools adjust moderately, the sum of demand–supply imbalances across all schools weakly decreases. Moreover, if all schools always adjust moderately and there is a unique stable matching, then adjustments converge to a market‐clearing cutoff vector. If there is more than one stable matching, moderate adjustments may cycle indefinitely, but the supremum and the infimum of all cutoff vectors observed along a cycle are both market‐clearing.