Weight‐ranked divide‐and‐conquer contracts
研究多代理人合同模型中，委托人如何通过按权重排序并分步诱导代理人接受合同，在悲观均衡选择下实现最优方案，适用于网络、公共品等场景。
This paper studies a large class of multi‐agent contracting models with the property that agents' payoffs constitute a weighted potential game. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents' strategic interactions. I fully characterize a contracting scheme that is optimal for the principal for all equilibrium selection criteria that are more pessimistic than potential maximization. This scheme ranks agents in ascending order of their weights in the weighted potential game and then induces them to accept their offers in a dominance‐solvable way, starting from the first agent. I apply the general results to networks, public goods/“bads,” and a class of binary‐action applications.