Syndicated Lending Relationships, Information Asymmetry, and Market Making in the Secondary Loan Market
研究了为何发起贷款的银行会在二级市场为其贷款做市，发现拥有更多借款人关系和声誉资本的银行更可能做市，且其做市降低了借款人的交易成本，这主要源于减少交易摩擦而非赚取做市利润。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates why commercial lenders make markets for the loans that they sell on the secondary market. Using loan‐level data, I find that origination lenders with extensive borrower relationships and more reputational capital at stake are more likely to serve as market makers. Greater participation of origination lenders as market makers is associated with lower trading costs for their borrowers' loans. This association remains even in conditions where origination lenders could exploit their information advantage for market making profits. Lenders benefit from being market makers by maintaining strong subsequent lending relationships with their borrowers. Collectively, this evidence is consistent with origination lenders' participation in the secondary market being motivated by reducing trading frictions rather than market making profits.