Advisors with hidden motives
研究顾问向潜在买家披露证据时，如何平衡最大化销售概率与引导销售转向高利润物品的目标，并分析强制披露动机的监管政策效果。
An advisor discloses evidence about an object to a potential buyer, who doesn't know the object's value or the profitability of its sale (the advisor's motives). I characterize optimal disclosure rules that balance two goals: maximizing the overall probability of sale, and steering sales from lower- to higher-profitability objects. I consider the implications of a regulation that forces the advisor to always reveal her motives to the buyer. I show that whether such policies induce the advisor to disclose more evidence about the object's value hinges on the curvature of the buyer's demand for the object. This result refines our understanding of effective regulation of advisor-advisee communication with and without commitment.