Conformism across games
研究了从众者和理性玩家在2x2博弈中的互动，计算了从众者的局部稳定比例，发现从众者在少数时表现更优，且当理性玩家认知成本足够高时，唯一稳定状态是两种行为规则在均衡中采用不同纯策略。
I study a population of conformist and rational players playing 2x2 games and calculate the locally stable fraction of conformists. I evaluate the fitness of each behavioral rule in all Nash Equilibria for each population share, discounting a cognitive cost to rational players. I find that conformists outperform rational players when in the minority because, in that case, the equilibrium is such that all strategies yield the same payoff. If the cognitive cost for rational players is sufficiently large, the only locally stable population composition is one in which each behavioral rule plays a different pure strategy in equilibrium.