Fresh cash for empty coffers? Changing developer obligations in Antwerp, Flanders
研究了佛兰德地区安特卫普市2016年引入的城市开发成本政策，发现其不仅是财政工具，更是政治手段，用于集中权力并引发民主监督、权力平衡等问题。
Extensive research highlights how local developer obligations (DOs) are increasingly used by local governments as value capture tools to generate new funds for spatial investment. This article examines why DOs have become a central focus and how their use affects urban planning and development. Using the case of Antwerp, Flanders, and its Urban Development Cost (UDC) policy introduced in 2016, it argues that the motivations for using DOs extend beyond financial considerations. In Antwerp, the UDC serves as a political instrument of statecraft, allowing the executive branch of the city’s democratic structure to create discretionary revenues and consolidate control over them. This centralization of power is obscured by a technocratic approach that standardizes UDC negotiations through calculative practices. Stakeholder interviews further reveal concerns over the mechanism of the UDC, citing diminished democratic oversight, power imbalances, and uneven geographic and economic impacts. The findings highlight the need to further examine how (sub-)local political dynamics shape the financialization of value capture and influence its legitimacy.