Presidential Particularism (and the Trump Anomaly): Evidence from Federal Contract Awards and Capital Markets
研究发现美国总统在联邦合同分配中存在偏袒行为，摇摆州和核心州企业在选举年获得更多合同，但特朗普任期内这一现象消失，市场对此反应不足。
Abstract We document presidential particularism in the allocation of U.S. federal government contracts. Firms in “Swing” and “Core” states receive disproportionately higher federal contracts during election cycles. Contracts peak in reelection years for incumbent presidents suggesting electoral and partisan motives. Awards to “Core” states fall relative to “Hostile” states in election years of the presidents’ second terms. Government agencies engage more aggressively in particularism when aligned with the president’s party. Particularism disappeared during the Trump presidency, with Hostile-state firms awarded more contracts. Market participants, who are slow to recognize the relationship between particularism and corporate earning, underreact to this phenomenon.