Does mandatory recognition of off–balance sheet liabilities affect capital structure choice? Evidence from SFAS 158
研究SFAS 158强制确认表外负债后，未评级DB计划发起公司通过净债务偿还和净股权发行降低财务杠杆，而受契约约束的公司主要通过净债务偿还调整，表明表内报告要求通过评级或契约渠道影响资本结构决策。
Abstract The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 158 mandates the recognition of previously disclosed off–balance sheet liabilities (OBLs) for sponsors of defined benefit (DB) retirement plans. This recognition significantly increases reported liabilities, with notable variation across DB plan sponsors. We find that unrated DB plan sponsors reduce financial leverage following OBLs recognition, driven by net debt retirements and net equity issuances. These adjustments appear optimal because they bring firms closer to their estimated leverage targets. In contrast, DB plan sponsors with tight, floating‐GAAP covenants also reduce financial leverage, primarily through net debt retirements. The evidence suggests that on–balance sheet reporting requirements impact capital structure decisions through a rating or a covenant channel.