Democracy and Natural Resources: Their Institutional Impact on Tax Haven Use by Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises
研究了民主和自然资源如何影响新兴市场跨国企业使用避税天堂的策略，发现民主水平越高避税越少，但自然资源租金越高则避税越多，且自然资源诅咒会削弱民主的正面作用。
Abstract This paper examines how the institutional environment influences multinational enterprise (MNE) strategies regarding tax haven use. We develop a theoretical framework linking democracy and natural resource endowments to the strategic use of tax havens in emerging markets. Using data from 4630 emerging market MNEs (EMNEs) between 2008 and 2018, we find that higher levels of democracy in an EMNE’s country of origin are associated with reduced tax haven use. However, the use of tax havens by EMNEs increases with higher natural resource rents in their home economies. Additionally, we find that natural resource rents moderate the impact of democracy on tax haven use, such that the natural resource curse weakens the positive effect of democracy on firm behavior. Our results offer important managerial and policy implications.