The value-added service investment strategy for the incumbent platform in response to a competitor entry
研究在位平台如何通过增值服务投资和定价策略应对竞争者进入，发现交叉网络效应强度影响策略选择，强效应时需对制造商侧高补贴、供应商侧高收费，弱效应时可收入场费。
For increasing users’ stickiness and enhancing competitive advantage, numerous third-party platforms are now concentrating on developing value-added services (VASs). This article concentrates on an incumbent platform that provides parts trading services for both side users (i.e., manufacturer-side and supplier-side). Considering that a potential entrant platform may enter the market to snatch users with the incumbent platform, we analyse how the incumbent platform deploys VAS and the relevant prices to cope with the competitor’s entry, taking into consideration cross-network effect (CNE). We find that when the entrant invests in more VAS to attract the users, it may be more beneficial for the incumbent not to provide VAS. When the CNE strength of manufacturer-side is strong, compared to the entrant, the incumbent should deploy more VAS and charge more for supplier-side but give manufacturer-side higher subsidies to deter the entrant entry. However, when the CNE strength of manufacturer-side is weak, the incumbent charging manufacturer-side an entrance fee can also discourage the entrant. Finally, when the incumbent cannot deter the competitor from entering, the incumbent may adopt “high service and high fee” strategy to supplier-side while “high service and high subsidy” strategy to manufacturer-side.