Institutional distraction and illegal business practices: The role of career concerns and wealth incentives
利用机构投资者投资组合的外生冲击，研究发现当机构投资者分心时，管理层会显著增加与利益相关者相关的不当行为；职业关注和风险承担股权激励会调节这一关系。
We exploit exogenous shocks to institutional investors’ portfolios to show that managers engage in significantly more stakeholder-related misconduct when institutional investors are distracted. Additional cross-sectional tests reveal that managerial career concerns and risk-taking equity incentives strongly moderate this relationship, suggesting that managers weigh the potential benefits and risks before engaging in misconduct during these periods. Finally, we provide evidence that the results are more pronounced when especially those institutional investors who are likely to be motivated monitors of the managers become distracted.