Managerial Opportunism and Corporate Investment Efficiency
研究用高管内幕交易衡量管理层机会主义，发现其通过降低财务报告质量损害企业投资效率，且影响程度受治理结构强弱调节，同时与会计业绩和风险调整后股票回报负相关。
Abstract Our study investigates how managerial opportunism, measured by executives' insider trading, affects corporate investment efficiency and performance. We find that such opportunism undermines investment efficiency, with distortions in financial reporting quality serving as a channel of influence. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that this impact varies depending on the strength of governance structures. We also observe a negative association between managerial opportunism and accounting performance metrics, as well as risk‐adjusted stock returns. Our findings are robust across various model specifications and measurements, emphasizing the significance of managerial opportunism as a personality trait in corporate decision‐making.