Hometown Favoritism and Political Rewards: Evidence From South Korean Municipalities
研究了韩国地方行政长官是否在拨款分配中偏袒家乡，发现内部选出的长官会多拨约20%的自主拨款给家乡，且支持者越集中的家乡获得越多，而外部选出的长官则无此偏向。
ABSTRACT We examine whether politicians favor their hometowns in the allocation of transfers as a strategy to reward core supporters. In South Korea, regional governors have discretion to allocate certain grants to municipalities without approval from the legislature. Using data from 226 South Korean municipalities across 15 regions, we find that the hometowns of internal governors, those elected within their home regions, receive approximately 20% more discretionary grants. Consistent with the core supporter model, we show that elected internal governors allocate more grants to hometown municipalities with a higher concentration of supporters. In contrast, external governors, those elected outside their home regions, exhibit no hometown bias. Our findings suggest that regional governors favor their hometowns because these areas tend to provide strong electoral support.