The inevitable disclosure doctrine: A facade or a curse in the CEO labor market
研究美国各州法院采纳不可避免披露原则如何影响杠杆率与CEO薪酬的关系，发现该原则削弱了杠杆率对薪酬的正向作用，对高流动性、高职业担忧的CEO影响更显著。
Our study examines how the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) across US state courts affects the relationship between leverage and CEO compensation. We find that the IDD adoption significantly attenuates the typically positive association between leverage and CEO pay. This effect is more pronounced for CEOs with higher ex-ante mobility, greater career concerns, weaker organizational influence, and higher firm-specific skills. Rejecting the IDD, on the other hand, amplifies the positive relationship between leverage and CEO pay. Our findings underscore the influence of labor market dynamics on CEO compensation.