Mobilizing credit for clean energy: De-risking and public loan provision under learning spillovers
分析银行对新型清洁能源技术的贷款行为，发现因学习溢出导致市场贷款不足或陷入无贷款均衡，提出公共贷款与去风险补贴的政策组合来解决协调与合作问题，并以德国海上风电早期阶段为例进行数值应用。
This paper analyzes bank lending behavior to novel clean energy technologies in the presence of high screening costs and potential learning-by-lending. In a two-period model, bank loans in the first period build up banks’ financing experience with the novel technology, which improves lending profitability and partially spills over to peers. Because of these learning externalities, such early-stage loans are either undersupplied by the market (a cooperation problem) or do not occur at all if the banking sector remains stuck in an inferior market equilibrium with no lending (a coordination problem). We propose a policy mix in which public loan provision eliminates the inferior equilibrium, thereby resolving the coordination problem, while de-risking subsidies internalize learning spillovers to peers. Our findings highlight the role of public financial policies if environmental and innovation externalities are already addressed, and we provide a numerical application to the early stage of offshore wind energy in Germany as a plausible context for our policy implications.