The use of client-engaged specialists to support opportunistic estimates: evidence from the insurance industry
利用保险业的独特披露数据，研究发现客户聘请的外部精算师显著影响理赔损失准备金中的机会主义行为，其影响程度接近审计师的一半。
Abstract We use unique disclosures in the insurance industry to examine whether client-engaged specialists (i.e., external actuaries) affect opportunism within the claim loss reserve. Using a fixed-effects approach, we find that external actuaries significantly affect the opportunism in the claim loss reserve, approaching half the effect of the auditor. With respect to actuary characteristics, we find a positive (negative) association between actuary permissiveness (actuary size) and opportunism in the claim loss reserve. In additional analyses, we find that the relation between actuary permissiveness and claim loss reserve opportunism is stronger when insurers have incentives to opportunistically manage the claim loss reserve. This relation continues to persist in the presence of high-quality auditors. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that client-engaged external actuaries can be used to support opportunistic claim loss reserve estimates.