When AI Becomes an Agent of the Firm: Examining the Evolution of AI in Organizations Through an Agency Theory Lens
从代理理论出发，探讨人工智能在企业决策中从模仿人类到成为自主代理的演进过程，分析如何通过监控和激励机制使AI代理与企业利益保持一致，对AI与组织理论的交叉研究及实践政策有启示。
Abstract Our work begins with the premise that the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into firm decision making parallels the emergence of the professional manager, which prompted the birth of agency theory. We examine the evolution of AI through an agency theory lens, considering how the nature of firm control and decision rights change as AI evolves. While AI will initially mimic human routines, we theorize a point at which the AI system will achieve a level of autonomy and self‐determination to be considered an agent of the firm. How, then, can we align an agent with the fate of the firm, when that agent is no longer a human? To address this, we integrate agency theory with a model of AI evolution, demonstrating that conflict between an AI agent and the firm will require a reconsideration of agency mechanisms if agent‐principal alignment is to be achieved. We theorize specific forms of monitoring and incentive alignment that serve to align an AI agent with the firm's interests, thus extending agency mechanisms in the context of AI. Our theoretical exercise offers important implications for scholarship at the intersection of AI and organizational theory, as well as considerations for practice and policy.