Package Bids in Combinatorial Electricity Auctions: Selection, Welfare Losses, and Alternatives
研究欧洲日前电力拍卖中因打包投标数量限制导致的投标选择难题，提出优化算法并量化福利损失，为拍卖方和投标方提供实用指导。
Day-ahead electricity auctions allow market participants to trade power for delivery the following day. In Europe, these auctions are designed as combinatorial auctions, enabling agents to submit package bids (“block bids”) that span multiple time periods rather than bidding separately for each hour. However, power exchanges impose limits on the number of package bids an agent can submit, creating a complex decision problem: Which packages should an agent bid on to best represent their preferences? In “Package Bids in Combinatorial Electricity Auctions: Selection, Welfare Losses, and Alternatives,” Hübner and Hug study this selection problem and propose decision-support algorithms that optimize bid choice under uncertainty. They provide theoretical bounds on welfare loss due to bid limits and validate their methods with simulations involving generators, storage systems, and flexible demand. Their findings offer actionable insights for both auctioneers and bidders.