Beyond the European Army Illusion: A Prudent Strategy for the Real European Zeitenwende
本文批评欧盟建立欧洲军队的设想不切实际，建议欧盟发挥监管和预算优势，作为双重安全管理者与北约分工合作，以应对美国战略收缩和俄罗斯威胁。
Geopolitics has forcefully re-arrived in Europe (Broeders et al., 2023; Farrell and Newman, 2023; Haroche, 2023). Take the return of large-scale territorial war in Ukraine (Bargués et al., 2023; Flockhart and Korosteleva, 2022; Johansson-Nogués and Leso, 2024) or the spreading trend towards economic de-risking and eventually de-globalisation (Bandemer et al. 2025; Herranz-Surrallés et al. 2024; Kornprobst and Paul, 2021). Policy-makers thus need to say goodbye to many ‘taken-for-granted’ notions that had socialised them into their professional careers. This imperative has acquired unprecedented urgency with President Trump's return to the White House in January 2025. His ‘America First’ doctrine, his explicit hostility towards multilateral institutions and his transactional approach to alliances have fundamentally transformed the transatlantic security landscape (Schütz and Mölling, 2025). The remarks of J.D. Vance, Trump's vice president, at the Munich Security Conference that European allies ‘must play a bigger role in the future of this continent’ and that ‘America focuses on areas of the world that are in great danger’ signal a withdrawal of America's strategic priorities away from Europe (Lu, 2025). Even before Trump 2.0, the diagnosis that the European Union's (EU) defence needs to be dramatically strengthened has been entrenched at both the member state and supranational levels. For example, French President Emanuel Macron had warned that Europe was ‘mortal’ and ‘can die’ (Le Monde, 2024). German Chancellor Scholz had declared that ‘[w]ithout security, everything else is nothing’ and that Germany seeks ‘to turn the Bundeswehr into Europe's strongest conventional force’ in the coming years (Scholz, 2024). This is why ‘[g]lobal military spending surges amid war, rising tensions and insecurity’ (Tian et al., 2023). At the supranational level, the perceived policy problem has been an environment of ‘strategic competition and complex security threats’ (European Union External Action, 2022), and the institutional solution has been to foster strategic autonomy (Fiott, 2022; Juncos and Vanhoonacker, 2024) and the gradual centralisation of military power into a ‘European Defence Union’ (Blockmans and Faleg, 2015) and, in the long term, a ‘true European Army’ (La Baum and Herzsenshorn, 2018; Samuel, 2022). The widespread perception that military capabilities are once again the sine qua non for survival as well as geopolitical influence has been growing. In other words, without your own military muscles, you become a rule-taker, rather than rule-maker, in world politics. While we agree with the diagnosis that more military capabilities will be helpful for the EU and its member states, we disagree with the policy advice of centralisation or even the need for a ‘European Army’. In this policy commentary, we recommend a more viable alternative instead, which can also be more swiftly implemented in the face of Trump 2.0 and its existential challenges to the transatlantic partnership. Our argument involves three interrelated dimensions: First, we argue that the essence of the new geopolitics is not a hierarchy of policy instruments with military muscle at the top. Instead, EU policy-makers need to adapt to a geopolitical environment in which neither security always trumps markets, as in the Cold War, nor markets always trump security, as in the post-Cold War (Farrell and Newman, 2023). Today, the provision of security is a cross-cutting task (Kruck and Weiss, 2025). The key recommendation is therefore to better understand and, then, to exploit the mutual complementarity of military and economic assets. Second, we argue that the EU's quest for an institutional solution – namely, to centralise military power – is distracting at best and counterproductive at worst. While centralisation may seem naturally appealing to some, we argue that it faces insurmountable constraints, such as high sovereignty costs, while offering few benefits. What is the added value of centralised armed forces run by either fragmented or democratically unaccountable decision-making bodies? Instead, the EU should move forward where it has done best. It is an increasingly effective security manager with sophisticated regulatory expertise and innovative budgetary instruments (Kruck and Weiss, 2023). Rather than investing efforts into unviable illusions, we recommend that the EU matures as a dual security manager. It should maintain and strengthen its efforts to weaponise member states, for example, by regulating arms procurement or providing incentives to develop capabilities. At the same time, however, the EU should broaden its focus more on the challenge of coercing adversaries. Third, we therefore argue that the EU must abandon a second illusion: that effective geopolitical coercion is feasible without close North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coordination, even when NATO will face weakened commitment by the United States. The way forward is to shape and exploit the distinct strengths of the two organisations in order to create synergies that make them more effective than the sum of their parts would suggest. It might be late, but not too late, for such a Real European Zeitenwende. President Trump's return to the White House and his latent threat to suspend military aid to Ukraine has transformed this imperative from hypothetical to existential. As European security is facing its greatest challenge for decades – an increasingly aggressive Russia coupled with a reluctant or even hostile transatlantic partner – the EU's evolution into an effective dual security manager is no longer desirable but essential for European resilience and survival. This implies not only saying goodbye to a European Army but also designing a prudent and resilient division of labour with (the willing parts of) NATO. If this succeeds, the EU will become a weaponising power, helping member states to build up their military muscles and coercing adversaries through smart cooperation with complementary partners. To put forward this argument, we first outline how the EU has used its role as security manager to arm member states. Second, we draw on the recent EU–NATO coordination in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine to illustrate why and how a prudent division of labour is the way forward in the new geopolitical era – even under the condition of diminishing US contributions. Third, we discuss caveats, propose recommendations and conclude with policy priorities of how the EU should implement the Real European Zeitenwende in order to succeed as a weaponising power. The EU has for long leveraged (1) regulatory and (2) budgetary instruments to enhance the military power of member states. By contrast, centralising military capacities in the form of a European Army is neither necessary nor desirable (Genschel, 2022, p. 1897). Modern security is multifaceted, encompassing economic, technological and traditional military aspects. Aware of these complexities, we argue that the EU has effectively acted as a security manager by doing what it has done in other policy areas: it regulates the behaviour of member states and private companies (Kruck and Weiss, 2023). This strategy has recently been reinforced by new budgetary instruments to provide financial incentives for member states to engage in geopolitical coercion (notably the so-called European Peace Facility [EPF]) and to encourage member states to cooperate with each other (notably the European Defence Fund [EDF]). We argue that this indirect regulatory and budgetary approach is particularly well suited to help mitigate the weakest link problems prevalent in EU security issues. More precisely, we hold that acting as a security manager rather than as a direct security provider offers the EU several mechanisms to mitigate these problems: first, EU funding instruments like the EDF can provide targeted support to less capable member states, helping them develop specific military capabilities aligned with EU-wide priorities. Second, the EU's regulatory framework can set minimum standards for military capabilities across member states, ensuring a baseline level of competence. Third, the approach allows for flexible coalitions of willing states to move forward on key initiatives, preventing individual member states from blocking progress. Importantly, this strategy addresses the weakest link problems without full centralisation, as political control over military assets remains at the member state level. This flexibility allows the EU to enhance collective capabilities while respecting national sovereignty concerns and divergent strategic cultures. The EU has done a great deal to indirectly strengthen its member states through its extensive regulatory powers. It has shaped military innovation within its borders by setting incentives and standards for military equipment (Schilde, 2023). This regulatory power determines the type and quality of weapons produced, indirectly shaping member states' military capabilities (Fiott, 2024; Weiss and Blauberger, 2016). Most significantly, the EU has practised its role as a security manager in arms production (Weiss and Biermann, 2022). Prior to 2009, EU defence procurement focused on domestic producers, invoking the exemption provided under Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Consequently, governments rarely applied competitive tendering procedures as per EU procurement legislation (Directives 2004/17 EC and 2004/18/EC).1 The result was little competition and an extremely inefficient defence-technological base in Europe. By contrast, today, there is Directive 2009/81/EC,2 which all member states have transposed into national law, and that has introduced competitive tender instruments to increase efficiencies in Europe's defence-technological base. National procurement agencies can no longer favour domestic suppliers without justification. Article 346 TFEU exemption will be applicable only if European law compromises national security. This led to increased competition and efficiency in the EU's defence market. While the EU's economic strength is undeniable in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, it faces a notable weakness in high-tech sectors crucial for coercive power in the modern geopolitical landscape. This challenge, however, aligns well with the EU's role as a dual security manager. The EU can leverage its regulatory and investment approach to bolster high-tech capabilities across member states, thereby addressing this strategic vulnerability. For instance, within the EDF, there is a dedicated EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which explicitly ‘supports actions that can help develop disruptive technologies based on concepts or ideas originating from “non-traditional defence's state-of-art” or emerging technologies equally disruptive contributing to the development of innovative defence systems’ (European Commission, 2024a). By allocating resources to areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and advanced materials, the EU aims to close the high-tech gap and enhance its geopolitical position.3 These concerted efforts, we hold, gradually strengthen the bloc's position in critical high-tech sectors, turning a current weakness into a future source of geopolitical leverage. Moreover, the EU has also evolved as a regulatory expert to address more recent challenges, such as cybersecurity or military artificial intelligence (AI) (Bode and Huelss, 2023; Dunn Cavelty and Smeets, 2023; Hoeffler, 2023; Schilde, 2023). the EU not and control these security Instead, it indirectly by setting and that the behaviour of member states and private and Weiss, 2021). It is in these areas that the EU should and its role as a security as it will be of help to member states in their military capabilities in the long the EU its to member states to military capabilities. By allocating it member states to weapons that are in with the bloc's security This budgetary and the military landscape of member states. For example, the EDF the rather than the of military This budgetary in arms production can be a to the will to European defence of this will to defence to The is to enhance defence cooperation member states through coordination, not centralisation (Fiott, 2024; Hoeffler, 2023). In a the EU military capabilities to strengthen European armed forces for EU-wide defence (European Defence 2023). The is for to support The EU member states to weapons to with through the the EU has used the to member states for their of military equipment to weapons et al., 2023). This has like and the states to and defence to Ukraine without the full financial how the EU effectively its budgetary instruments to and member states' security while respecting their sovereignty in military (European While capabilities can be through such an indirect we that critical areas like European defence or capabilities may more centralised we hold that the EU – acting as a security manager rather than the and of these capabilities – coordination without full military centralisation, for instance, through procurement and technological development of by coalitions of the recently have such when in the in funding for defence procurement under the European Defence through the 2024). of these focus on and defence the member states and for the procurement of defence and the Defence in member states and for the procurement of defence (European Commission, we that a security manager that member states' military efforts may not be to all of geopolitical if centralising military capabilities is not the solution the of how the EU can influence on the world that the EU as as well as to geopolitical and we argue that the essence of the new geopolitics is to economic and military assets. If the EU its own military capabilities for coercive on the world but is extremely in economic it should for with political but complementary assets. NATO remains the even under the condition of US We therefore recommend that the EU should from a manager into a dual security manager. It should forces with (the willing parts of) NATO to weaponise geopolitical a policy recommendation not need to be as a but the recent EU–NATO division of labour to Russia might provide a for such a Real European Zeitenwende. As a the EU with other across with and complementary the condition of and and 2024; 2022, 2024; and and and it has to its influence by with other et al., and 2024; and 2023). in the EU is a cooperation partner for other as it economic power to the that to weaponise with adversaries. to effectively economic a that other may to draw on 2023). the EU is capable of states' behaviour through economic the collective economic power of member states without military other military the EU's This approach more than While the of are and may not always full policy a in the EU's geopolitical For instance, not only have effective in the to the over its but also Russia is that the economic on by both war and have become increasingly how many it to to the defence the production to weapons at the are on the and 2024). The EU is thus to for economic capacities that other it coercive efforts et al., 2024a). 2022, the EU and NATO have their capabilities to strengthen Ukraine and the EU's role as a dual security manager. a on January Russia's Ukraine and support for while a for future actions (European 2023). have the coordination of For instance, the EU's in coordination on by a where the EU financial and support while NATO focuses on value by its security The is to create synergies in p. Moreover, both have to their and innovation such as the the EU Defence Innovation the NATO Defence Innovation and the NATO Innovation to mutual of policy in this EU and NATO are and in and p. approach has each other by an division of the the EU leveraged its economic power from its and has a of to Russia's economic strength by it of critical technologies and to its to war (European 2024a). In the EU has also on its budgetary instruments by the of the by by (European the other NATO leveraged its military expertise to the EU's and financial aid to Russia's invasion in 2022, NATO and have been providing unprecedented of direct military support to Ukraine 2024a). This support has weapons with a specific focus on and capabilities 2024). what if the United – or gradually – from President Trump's of military aid to Ukraine in et al., we argue that the EU needs to develop a development strategy that its autonomy while not with NATO also and Mölling, 2025). We propose that the EU should investing in three specific (1) advanced and defence that European while contributing to (2) defence and capabilities that address can be and strategic that both NATO and also the EU's on military European 2022). This would the EU to leverage its financial instruments – like the EDF and in defence – to strengthen member states' capabilities in that both collective defence within NATO and provide should US The development of like the and defence the of such an as these bolster defence while providing member states with defence capabilities 2023). We that the EU will also be to implement a development strategy by on military assets It should three of first, by on with that can within NATO if by European development in these sectors to and, by that maintain national sovereignty over while collective a approach would that European to NATO rather than EU member states' strategic autonomy – these capabilities are with both and in The of US policy – years of military support for Ukraine – has not only an for the EU's as a dual security manager but has also a to better help arm member states. The European response with the of an to be an into this the EU's to to security challenges through budgetary and regulatory mechanisms 2025). This – which to increased defence in for procurement and private – how the EU can leverage its economic strength to by US priorities 2025). These unprecedented that the EU has become of both the imperative and the to a dual security manager in time, rather than by to the to become security In the EU and NATO to Russia's by capacities to the coercive efforts that the other This division of labour synergies and thus increased of its war efforts Rather than a future European the EU should thus draw the from these actions that the Real European Zeitenwende will be when it its as a dual security manager. This policy from the that the new geopolitics has been by the – rather than the – of and security (Farrell and Newman, 2023). The the to exploit economic and coercive instruments for political and the better will the EU as a geopolitical in the widespread however, we hold that there is no need for a centralised European military Instead, we argue that the EU has – – as a security manager that regulatory and budgetary instruments to enhance the military power of its member states. there is more to the EU's geopolitical While many policy-makers to the of a European Army of we it as an unviable and policy We thus that the EU should – – exploit with other in and in This remains even if the United from its European with other will provide great to create synergies through a division of If the EU thus to as a dual security manager economic and security instruments at it will influence in the geopolitical by its to weaponise with other This will be the Real European Zeitenwende. this two need to be First, the return of Trump to the and his to military aid to Ukraine has transformed into the division of labour NATO and the this development may strengthen rather than the argument for the coordination that we The Trump and in the where Trump Ukraine of with War a in US policy that a more European response and an for the EU member states to over the role within NATO – with or without a reluctant United States. The EU has its economic leverage through Russia and the defence investment with military and this approach a that individual and has the for and of EU member states. As European President are in an era of in – a that the EU must its evolution as a dual security manager to for in US over a role within NATO help mitigate the of US which is even with Trump 2.0 et al., By national military capacities and European an indirect weaponising strategy that the EU as a security even in the of US a and indirect approach allows for to emerging while a more of defence member states. Second, the on the EU's increased weaponising efforts will its influence as a power We that this is not the Instead, the EU's power can also its economic and security capabilities. Take the United as an power of has been by its to but it has been by it In a the EU can strengthen its influence by the of its on issues. This approach allows it to maintain its position as a while to the of power politics. For example, a more capable EU more effectively and by up its efforts with economic and security As a however, European need to more the challenge of standards than a European will be as policy-makers the EU's weaponising efforts with its traditional role as a This is essential to the EU's and particularly in where its power has been a key If the EU in these challenges, we propose two policy priorities that will it to an effective dual security manager in First, the EU should new and up strategic investment focused on the economic and technological capabilities of member states in critical sectors rather than investing to military that at national levels. By the collective of and member states, the EU can coercive power without the need for a centralised military These should areas of both economic and geopolitical such as advanced of strategic with military and should also member states' to on member states while the EU's collective coercive which will its position as a in the a defence play a crucial role in this This which from the will not a traditional defence but rather a dual security the EU's indirect of geopolitical This will the gap security and economic ensuring a and effective response to the of the new Second, the EU should institutional cooperation with NATO – with or without a United – of to of its military While the coordination and cooperation the two has future EU policy should focus on a for and the division of labour the two where there are both a great need and a great to EU–NATO cooperation is While both have been their efforts to enhance cybersecurity 2022), these have been but be an for a response strategy to large-scale where and thus of across all of both organisations are What is new in the of geopolitics is that coercive in are to may military and economic may first and economic but political – such as will on Russia – a sophisticated of For the this is more of an than a In order to as a rather than a rule-taker, it should build on its strengths rather than by its its great as a dual security manager on military and economic assets the EU is well to its and to as a geopolitical – the key of the Real European Zeitenwende. funding and by